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In 2011, Qi Baishi and Zhang Daqian surpassed Pablo Picasso and Andy 
Warhol as the world’s top auction price earners.1 Zhang and Qi were not only 
the most popular artists in China, but also the best-selling artists in the world 
that year, earning more than $500 million and $445 million in auction revenue, 
respectively.2 In 2017, Qi’s “Twelve Landscape Screens” from 1925 sold for 
$141 million to a Chinese bidder.3 Qi’s sale by Chinese art house Poly Auction 
House solidified his reign as one of the decade’s most profitable painters, along 
with Pablo Picasso and Andy Warhol.4 In 2017, there was a 21% increase in 
 
*  Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2021; B.S. in Media, Culture and 
Communication, New York University, 2016. 
1  Katya Kazakina, Chinese Artist Ousts Picasso as Top Auction Earner, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 13, 
2012), https://www.bostonglobe.com/arts/2012/01/13/chinese-artist-ousts-picasso-top-auction-
earner/VpQGabeaORlUSdADDR7bcN/story.html. 
2  Id.; Liz Hammer, Zhang Daqian: A Guide to China’s Most Popular Artist, CHRISTIE’S (Oct. 21, 
2019), https://www.christies.com/features/10-things-to-know-about-Zhang-Daqian-9229-3.aspx. 
3  Ben Kwok, China’s Qi Baishi Now Among World’s ‘Most Profitable’ Painters, ASIA TIMES (Dec. 
19, 2017), https://www.asiatimes.com/2017/12/article/chinas-qi-baishi-now-among-worlds-
profitable-painters/. 
4  Charmmy Zhang, Qi Baishi Paintings Fetch Record US $141 Million at Auction, SOUTH CHINA 









295 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.  vol. XI:2 
Chinese and Asian art sales.5 However, in 2018, the Chinese and Asian art 
market sales declined by 17% and continued to decline in 2019.6 
In 2019, the three largest art markets were the United States (U.S.) (44%), 
the United Kingdom (U.K.) (21%) and China (19%). Sales in these three 
countries accounted for 84% of the global market’s total value in 2018, and all 
three countries are embroiled in ongoing economic turmoil, including Brexit, the 
U.S.-China Trade War, and the Hong Kong Protests.7 The stable ease of free 
market cross-border art transactions and the American precedent of art imported 
and exported duty free have been two of the main reasons the U.S. has dominated 
the global art market since the 1960s.8 “The U.S. is a global entrepôt market and 
trading center that couples strong domestic alongside foreign buying, with the 
latter facilitated by one of the most liberal trading regimes in place for the 
circulation of artworks, comprising low tariffs and few restrictions.”9 However, 
this economic stability was threatened in 2018 when the U.S. government 
imposed tariff restrictions on Chinese imports, including art and antiquities 
created in or imported from China.10 
On July 10, 2018, President Trump imposed a 10% tariff on $200 billion 
worth of Chinese imports ranging from chemicals, textiles, petroleum, robotics, 
fish, handbags, airplane parts, and—on the last page of the 205 page report—art 
and antiquities.11 U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer claimed the tariff 
was imposed as a response to unfair trade practices, including intellectual 
property and technology theft, and that the tariff targeted products that “benefit 
from China’s industrial policy and forced technology transfer practices.”12 
However, the high import tariff included Chinese paintings, drawings, pastels, 
prints, lithographs, original sculptures, and “antiques of an age exceeding one 
hundred years.”13 This meant that all artworks that originated in China, 
regardless of where they were imported from, would be subject to the tariff.14 
Because the U.S. Customs and Border Protection classifies tariffs based on the 
country of origin, the tariff applies based on an artwork’s geographic origin 
rather than the artist’s nationality, so pieces created by a Chinese artist in another 
country are exempted. For example, renowned Chinese artist Ai Weiwei lives in 
Berlin and produces artwork out of Germany so his work is exempted from the 
 
5  CLARE MCANDREW, THE ART MARKET 2019: AN ART BASEL & UBS REPORT 37 (2019). 
6  Elena Martinique, The Art and Finance Industry - Where Are We Now? A Deloitte Report 
Investigates, WIDEWALLS (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.widewalls.ch/deloitte-art-finance-report-
2019/. 
7  MCANDREW, supra note 5, at 16. 
8  Id. at 38. 
9  Id. at 392-393. 
10  Id. at 38. 
11  Ana Swanson & Jim Tankersley, U.S. Threatens Tariffs on $200 Billion of Chinese Goods, From 
Tilapia to Handbags, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/10/us/politics/trump-china-trade-war.html. 
12  OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, STATEMENT BY U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT LIGHTHIZER ON SECTION 301 ACTION (July 10, 2018), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/july/statement-us-trade-
representative. 
13  OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REQUEST FOR COMMENTS CONCERNING 
PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF ACTION PURSUANT TO SECTION 301: CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION 205 
(2018). https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2018-0026%20China%20FRN%207-10-2018_0.pdf. 
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tariff.15 Yet, an American artist who made an art piece in China would not be 
exempted and would be prevented from exporting her artwork to the U.S. 
The tariff effected all art imported from China, in addition to art created in 
China and exported from any national port in the world.16 For clarification, these 
tariffs applied to any artist—American, Chinese, or any other nationality—
producing artwork in and exporting from China, and any art that was created in 
China. China retaliated with its own tariffs on American products, which 
prompted the U.S. to raise its tariff from 10% to 15% on September 1, 2019.17 
Thus, an American art collector purchasing an artwork created by a Chinese 
artist from a European owner in Hong Kong would have to pay 15% more than 
the auction price. Art collectors in New York buying an artwork that originated 
in China would have to pay the 9% state sales tax in addition to the 15% federal 
tariff.18 Organizations like the Art Dealers Association of America, the British 
Antique Dealers’ Association, the Association of Art Museum Directors, and 
international auction houses Sotheby’s and Christie’s filed complaints 
explaining that “the art market is completely distinct from the market for 
industrial and manufactured goods” such that “imposing duties on Chinese-
origin antique art will not result in increased demand for American-made antique 
art,” while noting that almost all qualifying Chinese artworks are imported from 
countries other than China, so there would be no detrimental effect on its 
economy.19 Additionally, of the total $7.1 billion Chinese art and antiquities 
sales in 2017, $5.1 billion worth of sales occurred within mainland China.20 This 
premium placed only on American buyers would inevitably move international 
trade from New York to London, Paris, and Hong Kong.21 The tariff would 
effectively remove all American competitive pricing capability and drive U.S. 
competitors out of China, thereby granting Chinese dealers and auctioneers full 
monopoly over those art sales. Moreover, regardless of where the cultural 
property was found, all 100-year-old or more Chinese-originating artworks were 
effectively cost-prohibited from exhibition in any U.S. museum, institution, 
gallery, or auction if they were not already imported before the tariff was in 
effect, which reduced critical cultural exchange at the heart of the international 
art world.22  
 
15  Id. 
16  MCANDREW, supra note 5, at 38. 
17  Eileen Kinsella, A Newly Increased Trump Tariff on Chinese Goods Will Rattle the Art Market in 
America, Trade Experts Say, ARTNET NEWS (Aug. 29, 2019), https://news.artnet.com/art-
world/china-tariffs-trump-art-market-1637782 (recounting the various industry experts’ concerns, 
including that “it is hard to see how this [tariff] will have a material impact on Chinese trade policy” 
and that “the imposition of tariffs on art from China will have a detrimental impact on many American 
art dealers. With the tariffs in place, it will be virtually impossible for these businesses to price 
artwork competitively within the global art market”...“the move would be warmly welcomed by the 
Chinese government and the art auctioneers and dealers in China because it will likely drive many of 
China’s American competitors out of business and further redirect sales to Chinese dealers serving a 
mostly Chinese clientele”).   
18  Reyburn, supra note 14. 
19  Id; see also Sarah Cascone, The US and China Have Reached a Trade Deal—But What Does That 
Mean for Chinese Art and Antiquities?, ARTNET NEWS (Dec. 17, 2019), https://news.artnet.com/art-
world/what-does-us-china-trade-deal-mean-for-art-tariffs-1732263. 
20  Eileen Kinsella, The Key Findings of Art Basel’s 2017 Global Art Market Report, ARTNET NEWS 
(Mar. 22, 2017), https://news.artnet.com/market/key-findings-art-basel-ubs-report-899525. 
21  Reyburn, supra note 14. 
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The punitive tariff disproportionately harmed American institutions and 
investors with a counterproductive effect on Chinese trade policy, and it clearly 
misplaced cultural heritage such as ancient art and antiquities inside the scope 
of the tariff’s purpose of protecting domestic industrial manufacturing and 
technological intellectual property.23 The American public was punished rather 
than the Chinese government, and China gained an even stronger foothold in the 
global art market because international demand and sales of these works were  
largely redirected to China, which continued to import and export art duty-free.24  
Many major international auction houses and dealers, such as Sotheby’s and 
Christie’s, vehemently opposed this tariff. Sotheby’s sold roughly $77 million 
in its three Chinese departments over 10 sales in 2017 and Christie’s sold almost 
$40 million in Chinese art and objects during New York’s Asia Week in early 
2018.25 Countless ancillary operations and employers, such as transportation and 
shipping logistics companies, that depend on the art market were indirectly 
harmed as well.26 Due to fierce protests and industry outrage from the U.S. art 
market, especially after President Trump announced a proposed increase from 
15% to 25% import tariff on Chinese goods, including antiques and artifacts, 
government officials agreed to reduce the art import tariff to 7.5% but still 
refused to eliminate it.27 
Although this tariff affected only a small share (5%) of the total value of art 
and antiquities imported into the U.S. (compared to an estimated 50% share of 
art and antiquities imports from France and the UK), there was a direct 
correlation between market confidence and investor fears over international art 
transactions on U.S. soil.28 The U.S. Trade Commission reported Chinese 
antiquities imports totaled $107.2 million in 2017, “while paintings, drawings, 
pastels, and other original works of art total[l]ed $114.5 million.”29 Global sales 
from auction houses Christie’s, Phillips, and Sotheby’s fell 20.3% in the first 
half of 2019 and the risk perception of the overall art market increased by 10%.30 
The collateral damage of this retaliatory, excessive tariff on Chinese art and 
antiquities, especially the proposed 25% tariff, would only benefit the Chinese 
government’s efforts to redirect Chinese art back to China, thereby 
strengthening Chinese auction houses linked to its government and reorienting 
the global art industry.31 
This paper analyzes the imposition of U.S. import tariffs on art and cultural 
property as foreign policy within the context of modern economic warfare.  Part 
II provides a brief political and historical overview of U.S. tariffs, and focuses 
on the Chinese art import tariffs imposed during the ongoing U.S.-China Trade 
War.  Part III explores the modern international art market and the role of art as 
 
23  Anna L. Sussman, What the U.S.-China Trade War Means for the Art Market, ART MARKET (Jul. 23, 
2018), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-us-china-trade-war-art-market. 
24  Id.  
25  Id. 
26  MCANDREW, supra note 5, at 38; see also Cascone, supra note 19. 
27  Margaret Carrigan, Chinese Art and Antiquities Spared from Trump’s Tariffs, THE ART NEWSPAPER 
(Sept. 18, 2018, 21:15 BST), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/chinese-art-and-antiquities-
spared-from-trump-s-tariffs. 
28  MCANDREW, supra note 5, at 38; see also Cascone, supra note 19 (explaining that US collectors and 
dealers rarely import art from mainland China because the mainland Chinese government prohibits 
the export of all Chinese antiques). 
29  Carrigan, supra note 27. 
30  DELOITTE, ART & FINANCE REPORT 2019 (6th ed. 2019). 
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cultural property, as cultural “soft power,” and as an economic driving force.  
Part IV delves into the various private and public parties that are impacted by 
these import tariffs, including auction houses, art collectors, art fairs, and 
museums.  Part V concludes with a reflection on how these cultural property 
tariffs are economically counterproductive trade policies, and therefore are more 
representative of the political ideologies underlying foreign policy, such as the 
economic nationalism of the Trump Administration.  
 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. TARIFFS  
 
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. TARIFFS 
  
What is a tariff? Tariffs, or customs duties, are used by almost all countries 
as a tax on products purchased from abroad, “usually designed to collect revenue 
or to give a price advantage to a domestic product over an imported one.”32 
Tariffs have played an integral role in shaping American economic and foreign 
policy. The notorious 1773 Boston Tea Party and the Boston Massacre resulted 
from the punitive Townshend Acts in the mid-1760s that Britain imposed on 
American colonists to import taxes on a range of necessary goods (including tea, 
glass, paper and lead).33 Although the U.S. was staunchly opposed to tariffs (no 
taxation without representation), the War of 1812 showed that the U.S. needed 
to tax imported goods to become self-sufficient and compete against Britain. 
However, this realization resulted in the Embargo of 1807, which was meant to 
catalyze national manufacturing production and successfully established the 
textile industry, but at the expense of placing extremely harsh tariffs on most 
imported goods, even cheap copper.34 In 1828, President Adams imposed a tax 
rate of 38% on almost all imported goods in an effort to promote an industrial 
revolution but received intense backlash.35 Adams’ successor, President 
Jackson, issued a more modest tariff in 1832 but when southern states refused to 
comply, the “nullification crisis” ensued and Jackson issued a “force bill” that 
allowed him to enforce compliance by using military force, to which South 
Carolina responded with the threat to leave the Union entirely.36 The 1833 
Compromise Tariff, a tariff that would decrease each year for ten years, was 
enacted by Congress but failed to follow through on its promises shortly after 
passage.37 
Henry Clay’s 1844 winning presidential slogan was “Champion of a 
Protective Tariff,” which represented the south’s weariness with northern 
economic protectionism.38 By 1846, President Polk passed the Walker Tariff, 
which was a low tariff that supported the southern agricultural industry and 
 
32  Let’s Talk Tariffs, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (FEB. 2, 2019), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/webcas_e/ltt_e/ltt2_e.htm. 
33  Ryan P. Smith, A History of America’s Ever-Shifting Stance on Tariffs, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE 
(Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/history-american-
shifting-position-tariffs-180968775/. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
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remained low until the Civil War.39 The Morrill Tariff was passed in 1861 by 
President Buchanan, which promoted northern industrial companies and 
provided necessary funding for the imminent Civil War.40 This trade 
protectionist policy remained until the Great Depression when President Hoover 
enacted the Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930.41 This tariff was meant to mitigate the 
fallout from the 1929 stock market crash but instead significantly worsened 
international and national economic relations.42 
It wasn’t until WWII and the Cold War that free trade as an American policy 
became an established ideology.43 Those crises forced the U.S. to improve its 
economic, militaristic, and diplomatic ties with allies while technological 
developments, particularly the improved transportation and distribution 
network, were paving the way for our modern global economy.44 The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created in 1947, and would later 
become the World Trade Organization (WTO). The U.S. joined GATT in 1948 
and the WTO in 1995, and China joined the WTO in 2001.45   
Bipartisan cooperation remained until President Bush implemented a steel 
tariff in 2002 that undermined the goal of helping the steel industry and was 
repealed within 18 months.46 Similarly, President Trump’s 2016 presidential 
campaign targeted coal and steel workers with a promise of protecting U.S. 
industries and subsequently imposed tariffs on Chinese goods, including steel 
and aluminum.47 However, unlike steel, aluminum, cars, and televisions, there 
is no equivalent product to an ancient Chinese scroll that can be made in the 
U.S.. Cultural property embodies a nation’s identity and history, and the punitive 
tariff imposition therefore reveals an emerging policy of economic nationalism 
under the guise of economic protectionism.48 
 
B. THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE U.S.-CHINA TRADE WAR 
 
October 1, 2019 marked the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC).49 Chairman Mao Zedong announced the formation of 
the PRC on October 1, 1949, yet the dramatic growth that catapulted China onto 
the world stage as an economic superpower rivaling the U.S. began in the late 
 
39  Id. 
40  Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Lincoln’s Tariff War, MISES INSTITUTE (May 6, 2002), 
https://mises.org/library/lincolns-tariff-war.   
41  Smith, supra note 33. 
42  Id. 
43  Id.  
44  Id. 
45  United States of America and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/usa_e.htm; Yang Yao, China’s Export-Led 
Growth Model, EAST ASIA FORUM (Feb. 27, 2011), 
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/27/chinas-export-led-growth-model/. 
46  Doug Palmer, Why Steel Tariffs Failed When Bush Was President, POLITICO (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/07/steel-tariffs-trump-bush-391426. 
47  Smith, supra note 33. 
48  Craig M. Bargher, The Export of Cultural Property and United States Policy, 4 DEPAUL J. ART, 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 189, 196 (1994); see also Sarah Cascone, The US and China Have Reached 
a Trade Deal—But What Does That Mean for Chinese Art and Antiquities?, ARTNET NEWS (Dec. 17, 
2019), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/what-does-us-china-trade-deal-mean-for-art-tariffs-
1732263. 
49  Robin Brant, China Anniversary: Beijing Celebrations Mark 70 Years of Communist Rule, BBC 
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1970s under the direction of “the architect of China,” Deng Xiaoping.50 Despite 
implementing the one-child policy and ordering the crackdown on the 
Tiananmen Square protests that led to the infamous and bloody massacre (or as 
it’s known in China: the “June 4 Incident”), Time Magazine named Deng 
“Person of the Year” twice, in 1978 and 1985.51 Deng demonized Western forces 
as secretive, corrupt, and subversive threats to Communist ideals, while he 
simultaneously embraced foreign investment and established the state-managed, 
communist capital market that remains in place today.52 The largest single 
incident of poverty alleviation in world history occurred under, and because of, 
his leadership.53 “Since 1999, more than 400 million Chinese people have been 
lifted from extreme poverty.”54 The world was not prepared for China’s rapid 
rise to become the second most powerful economic power in just twenty-five 
years from relative isolation and overwhelming poverty.55 But unlike other 
commodity-driven countries like Brazil (iron ore), Indonesia (rubber), or Russia 
(oil and gas), China had an unparalleled population, which was an estimated 1.4 
billion in 2017,56 and therefore had a comparative advantage in its abundant low-
cost labor market, which employed 786 million people in 2017.57  Beginning in 
1978, Deng’s economic reform was characterized by its export-led growth 
model that managed double-digit growth rates as China became the world’s 
factory, which was accelerated further when it gained critical membership to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.58 
The WTO is an international organization whose purpose is to ensure trade 
flows smoothly, predictably, and as freely as possible by acting as a forum for 
negotiating trade agreements and settling trade disputes between its members.59 
Ironically, the biggest supporter of China becoming a WTO member was none 
other than the United States.60 In 2000, the U.S. removed economic restrictions 
on China that had been in place for two decades as part of anti-Communist 
policy.61 The historic House of Representatives vote to pass legislation granting 
Permanent Normal Trading Relations (PNTR) with China had surprising 
 
50  Id. 
51  Jennifer Rosenberg, Time’s ‘Person of the Year’ List, THOUGHT CO. (Jan. 3, 2021), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/times-man-of-the-year-list-1779824. 
52  Chris Buckley, New Documents Show Power Games Behind China’s Tiananmen Crackdown, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/world/asia/china-tiananmen-
crackdown.html. 
53  James Levinsohn, U.S.-China Trade: The Economics Behind the Politics, YOUTUBE (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jZ-7hh0a8TQ. 
54  What Happened When China Joined the WTO?, WORLD 101: GLOBAL ERA ISSUES, 
https://world101.cfr.org/global-era-issues/trade/what-happened-when-china-joined-wto. 
55  Levinsohn, supra note 53. 
56  Population, Total: China, THE WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2018&locations=CN&start=1960&view=
chart. 
57  Levinsohn, supra note 53. 
58  Yang Yao, China’s Export-Led Growth Model, EAST ASIA FORUM (Feb. 27, 2011), 
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/27/chinas-export-led-growth-model/. 
59  The WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (last visited Apr. 27, 2021), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm. 
60  See Eric Schmitt & Joseph Kahn, The China Trade Vote: A Clinton Triumph; House, in 237-197 
Vote, Approves Normal Trade Rights for China, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2000), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/25/world/china-trade-vote-clinton-triumph-house-237-197-vote-
approves-normal-trade-rights.html. 
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bipartisan support.62 That vote granted China normal trading privileges in a 
“crowning foreign policy triumph” that reduced Chinese tariffs and removed 
economic barriers on industrial and agricultural products.63 In the words of 
President Clinton, this momentous shift represented “an historic step toward 
continued prosperity in America, reform in China and peace in the world . . . it 
will open new doors of trade for America and new hope for change in China.”64  
The United States’ endorsement of China as an equal trading partner paved 
the way for China’s accession into the WTO in 2001.65 But why was the U.S. so 
supportive of China’s rise as a competitive economic player? The U.S. believed 
membership in the WTO would inevitably lead to China becoming a democracy 
because, as President H.W. Bush said, “[n]o nation on Earth has discovered a 
way to import the world’s goods and services while stopping foreign ideas at the 
border.”66 Yet current President Xi Jinping captured the reality that China has 
managed to reject democracy while becoming an even stronger communist 
economic superpower: “No force can ever stop the Chinese people and nation 
from marching forward.”67 Since 2001, China’s economy has octupled to 
become the world’s second largest economy after the U.S.: China became the 
world’s largest exporter of goods in 2009, hit $7,000 per capita GDP in 2013, 
and increased its trade with the U.S. from less than $8 billion in 1986 to almost 
$580 billion in 2016.68   
Deng’s “open door” economic reform also included new laws that were 
meant to attract foreign investors and secure legal protections for them in a stable 
environment.69 One of the most impactful legal initiatives was the 1979 Joint 
Venture Law, which allowed foreign firms to establish a presence and operate 
in China through joint ventures with state partners, essentially functioning as 
limited liability companies.70 This legislation opened the world to an untapped, 
exploding consumer market, and, in exchange, the Chinese government could 
obtain advanced technology, export manufactured goods at unprecedented rates, 
and pave “the road to the inevitable adoption of communism.”71 In fact, nearly 
70%  of about 1.9 million privately owned companies in China, both Chinese 
and foreign firms, have internal party organizations known as CCPs.72 While 
their legally-mandated presence in each firm is largely symbolic, there have been 
recent reports of political pressure to revise joint-venture agreements to increase 
party governance and direct control over internal investment operations and 
decisions.73  
 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  What Happened When China Joined the WTO?, supra note 54.  
65  Schmitt & Kahn, supra note 60. 
66  Kurt M. Campbell & Ely Ratner, The China Reckoning, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar./Apr. 2018), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning.   
67  Brant, supra note 49. 
68  Id.  
69  Barbara Campbell Potter, China’s Equity Joint Venture Law: A Standing Invitation to the West for 
Foreign Investment?, 14 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 1, 5 (1993).  
70  Id. 
71  Id. at 2.  
72  Michael Martina, Exclusive: In China, the Party’s Push for Influence Inside Foreign Firms Stirs 
Fears, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2017, 3:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-
companies/exclusive-in-china-the-partys-push-for-influence-inside-foreign-firms-stirs-fears-
idUSKCN1B40JU. 
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While the U.S. had hoped joining the WTO would force China to comply 
with its policies regarding intellectual property rights and tariffs, China has used 
the international platform to its benefit and fully integrated into the global 
economy.74 Gaining WTO membership meant China was allowed to receive the 
regular “most favored nation” tariffs which run at 3% or 4% instead of 37%, 
which meant exported Chinese goods became significantly cheaper.75 China’s 
questionable practices have resulted in forty-three WTO cases filed against it, of 
which twenty-three were filed by the U.S.76 But WTO membership also meant 
that China could file cases against the U.S., and it has filed nine cases since 
2003.77 The most recent WTO ruling predates the current trade war but will 
make a large impact on the current power struggle: China can impose tariffs up 
to $3.6 billion on U.S. goods due to the U.S. government’s violation of anti-
dumping rules regarding Chinese products.78  For reference, the U.S.-China 
Trade War began in July 2018 and is still ongoing as of January 2020. The U.S. 
has imposed exclusive tariffs on $550 billion worth of Chinese goods, and China 
has imposed exclusive tariffs on $185 billion worth of U.S. goods.79 
 
 
III. THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL MARKET AND THE ROLE OF 
ART 
 
A. ART AS CULTURAL PROPERTY 
  
In 1776, Adam Smith highlighted the importance of investing in culture to 
enhance an individual’s and a nation’s wealth in his book An Inquiry Into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.80 By investing in tangible 
commodities such as books, statues, paintings, and jewels, one could 
continuously expand one’s wealth.81 Similarly, “[n]oble palaces, magnificent 
villas, great collections of books, statues, pictures and other curiosities, are 
frequently both an ornament and an honour, not only to the neighbourhood, but 
to the whole country to which they belong.”82  One danger of cultural property 
classification is that cultural objects, including art, become tradable 
commodities that are valued by their transactional mobility rather than their 
intangible contextual and historical significance.83 This categorization of 
national cultural heritage authorizes exportation of cultural goods that can be 
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monetarily priced as products within international trade, which “divides itself 
into source nations and market nations.”84  
Source nations, such as Egypt, Mexico, Greece, and India, are those that are 
“rich in cultural artifacts beyond any conceivable local use” and whose “supply 
of desirable cultural property exceeds the internal demand.”85 Market nations, 
like the United States, France, Switzerland, Japan, and Scandinavia, are wealthy 
and encourage importation from source nations because internal demand vastly 
exceeds the supply.86 Typically, source nations are economically poor and 
depend upon international trade but often have some of the most restrictive 
retention schemes to prevent the exportation (and exploitation) of their national 
cultural heritage.87 Notably, some nations can be both a source nation and a 
market nation, within which China falls squarely because China’s cultural 
heritage is subject to strict retention schemes according to state legislation and 
bilateral treaties but is simultaneously a major product of the national push for 
cultural exportation over the past few decades. Cultural nationalists believe the 
wealth of a nation is inextricably linked to its cultural property and that “a 
cultural object’s presence in the country is necessary to maintain the nation’s 
welfare and identity.”88  
Cultural internationalists, on the other hand, believe that cultural property is 
not linked to one national jurisdiction but rather to all of humanity, escaping the 
notions of traditional property rights.89 This internationalist perspective 
characterizes the most amenable and broad definition of cultural property as 
stated in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
Convention of 1970 (“UNESCO”). The 1970 UNESCO Convention’s definition 
of cultural property is “the legacy of physical artefacts and intangible attributes 
of a group or society that are inherited from past generations, maintained in the 
present and bestowed for the benefit of future generations.”90 It further includes 
“movable heritage such as sculptures, paintings, coins and manuscripts” under 
its definition of tangible cultural heritage.91 The 1954 and 1999 Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict defined cultural property as “movable or immovable property of great 
importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of 
architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular . . . of historical or artistic 
interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical 
or archaeological interest.”92 The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally 
Exported Cultural Objects defined cultural property as “those which, on 
religious or secular grounds, are of importance for archaeology, prehistory, 
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history, literature, art or science.”93 This perspective emphasizes the importance 
of preservation over retention and repatriation because “many art-rich countries 
simply cannot afford to take care of all of their cultural property.”94 
Most countries have ratified or modified the 1970 UNESCO Convention for 
their own legislations and China is no exception. In addition to using the 
UNESCO definition of cultural heritage, China expressly includes as part of its 
protected cultural relics “valuable works of art and handicraft articles dating 
from various historical periods.”95 China’s primary laws regarding cultural 
property are the 2002 Law and the 1997 Criminal Law.96 Similar to how the U.S. 
finds its authority to regulate trade in its Constitution, China’s authority to 
regulate trade is found in Article 22 of its 1982 Constitution which “protects 
places of scenic and historical interest, valuable cultural monuments and relics 
and other important items of China’s historical and cultural heritage.”97 This 
broad definition of national cultural property is further categorized into 
“valuable” and “ordinary” cultural relics with accompanying levels of 
protection.98 China has entered into several bilateral agreements with other 
nations, including the U.S., to promote its repatriation and protection of cultural 
heritage. However, it is frequently criticized for its lack of adequate authenticity 
standards and lack of criminal enforcement in the illegal cultural property 
trade.99  
The U.S. allows for liberal exportation of its cultural property while 
simultaneously protecting it. It did not ratify the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, but it did enact several 
regulations prohibiting importation of stolen and illegally trafficked cultural 
property. For example, the U.S. ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property and incorporated the UNESCO Convention 
definition of cultural property into domestic law through the enactment of the 
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (“CPIA”).100 
Additionally, Congress regulates imports and exports of cultural property under 
the Commerce Clause.101 Once the U.S. identifies an object as “cultural 
property,” it gains special legal status that confers certain protections and 
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privileges.102 Domestically, the U.S. has many federal statutes protecting and 
defining its own cultural property, including the National Historical Preservation 
Act of 1996, the American Antiquities Preservation Act of 1982, the National 
Stolen Property Act, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, and 
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990.103 In 
2016, the Cultural Property Advisory Committee (“CPAC”) was created under 
the Protect and Preserve International Cultural Property Act to aid foreign 
nations seeking to protect their cultural heritage from importation.104 Protected 
objects that fall within those statutory scopes are primarily those categorized 
under American national heritage, often owned and controlled by the 
government on federal land, or related to an historical government interest, such 
as the Statue of Liberty, the Smithsonian Institutes’ collections, and the Liberty 
Bell.105 
Most countries enforce extensive restrictions on cultural property 
exportation; however, outside of limited exceptions regarding archaeological 
objects removed from federal or Native American lands and protected wildlife, 
the U.S. does not place restrictions on cultural property exportation.106 The U.S. 
and Switzerland are the principal exceptions to enforcing strict prohibitions and 
limitations on exporting their own national cultural property.107 “US national 
policy generally favours free export of cultural material and thus its legal system 
does not specifically regulate the export of cultural material.”108  
To understand the strategic legislative design behind this decision, one must 
look to the history of U.S. export policies. The U.S. Neutrality Laws of 1935 had 
enacted export controls only on weapons before World War Two (WWII).109 
After WWII, when the U.S.S.R. was gaining international power and control, 
the Export Administration Act of 1949 (EAA) was passed as the economic 
liberalization and foundation of the U.S.’s modern export system that expanded 
the regulation of imports and exports beyond weapons.110 The EAA embodied 
America’s burgeoning power on the world stage and its rejection of isolationism 
by opening free trade of commodities between its European allies and denying 
the importation of Communist goods.111 The President had broad authoritative 
scope to restrict any goods that threatened domestic stability or the U.S.’s 
technological and military superiority.112 That language is eerily reminiscent of 
President Trump’s rationale of stabilizing the U.S. economy and protecting 
American manufacturing and technological superiority as the dominant world 
power in the ongoing trade war with China. A nation’s cultural heritage 
embodies its international political and socio-economic power. Importation of 
certain commodities thus symbolizes the importation of a nation’s ideologies 
and an explicit embargo on a nation is a foreign policy statement. For example, 
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in 1980, the Carter administration embargoed the U.S.S.R. for its human rights 
violations when the Soviet Union’s military intervened in Afghanistan.113  
 
B. ART AS POWER 
 
In the late 1980s, leading American political scientist and scholar Joseph S. 
Nye, Jr. coined the term “soft power” as “the ability of a country to persuade 
others to do what it wants without force or coercion.”114 The U.S. has dominated 
as a world power for decades because of its hard and soft power: “the ability to 
coerce others as well as the ability to shape their long-term attitudes and 
preferences” through its export of entertainment, ideals, and culture.115 Nye 
further noted: 
 
In essence, power is nothing more than the ability to affect 
others to get what you want, and that requires a set of tools. 
Some of these are tools of coercion or payment, or hard power, 
and some are tools of attraction, or soft power. For individuals, 
charisma (emotional appeal), vision, and communication are 
key soft-power skills; for nations, soft power is embodied in 
their culture, values, and legitimate policies.116 
 
Essentially, Nye is saying that a country’s likeability and attractiveness through 
its perceived ideologies, social, and cultural norms are a major factor in shaping 
international economics and politics.117 
The U.S. wielded the soft power of art as a weapon during the Cold War. 
Joseph Stalin, as the de facto leader of the U.S.S.R.’s Communist Party, had 
standardized the Soviet Union’s ideology so that education, language, industrial 
production, and art all conformed to the political ideal.118 Most importantly, 
Stalin’s “socialist realist” aesthetic was the antithesis of the American abstract 
expressionist movement, which at first was deemed Communist until the Central 
Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) weaponized it against the U.S.S.R.119 Under the 
“International Program,” the Museum of Modern Art’s government-laden board 
of directors in New York strategically loaned pieces to European entities to 
create thirty-three full international exhibits dedicated to the American abstract 
expressionist movement.120 Ironically, the C.I.A. embraced the very art that was 
created in political protest and rejection of the dominant American aesthetic at 
the time as a proliferation of American values like freedom of speech, 
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individualism, and capitalism through art exportation.121 That Cold War C.I.A. 
operation led to artists like Pollock, De Kooning, and Rothko becoming 
renowned household names in the U.S. and abroad, selling some of the most 
expensive pieces in history, and resulting in the abstract expressionist movement 
embodying America itself. 
Globalization has often been synonymous with “Americanization” or 
“Westernization” due to the hard and soft economic, social, and political 
influence the U.S., along with other Western European nations, has had on the 
rest of the world. However, as much as America is perceived as the dominant 
“Western Imperialist,” it is important to remember that 
 
For every McDonald's in Japan, there must be at least a 
hundred sushi bars in the United States; for every Kentucky 
Fried Chicken in China, there must be thousands of Chinese 
restaurants in the United States. And for every Andy Warhol 
or Helen Frankenthaler in East Asian art collections, there are 
thousands of Chinese and Japanese scrolls in American 
museums.122 
 
China is no stranger to controlling the soft power of cultural ideology, largely 
through government funded propaganda campaigns, and in 2007 publicly 
prioritized a national plan to promote “the greatness of Chinese culture in 
general and the historical significance of the Middle Kingdom” to complement 
its rise as an economic superpower.123 Under the 2013 “Belt and Road 
Initiative,” it is estimated that China is investing approximately $10 billion 
annually on soft power alone to improve its international image that is marred 
by its repressive, state-infiltrated political system that continues to censor its 
citizens, crack down on any political dissonance, and violate international 
human rights laws.124 This national PR campaign spans educational, cultural, 
lingual, and media initiatives that include literature, film, music, sports, pandas, 
and art.125  
Despite China’s best efforts, significant monetary investment, and economic 
incentives, China is struggling to be globally likeable, and unsurprisingly, there 
was overwhelming dislike and distrust in Western democratic countries.126 
While the U.S. has managed to combine its hard and soft power to influence 
other nations under what Nye terms “smart power,” China’s ever-tightening 
authoritarian political system falls under “sharp power,” which is predicated on 
“distraction and manipulation” rather than attraction and persuasion.127 China’s 
failure to exert soft power effectively stems from the words versus actions of the 
country’s leaders. For example, China’s major push for Hollywood deals and 
international media outlet expansions directly contradicts its foreign film 
restrictions and bans such as the 2018 law that “specifically requires that 
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programs should not feature actors with tattoos [or depict] hip hop culture, sub-
culture (non-mainstream culture) and dispirited culture (decadent culture).” 128 
This means countries like South Korea, whose two largest trading partners are 
China and the U.S., can no longer export one of its biggest and fastest-growing 
products to China: K-Pop.129 
Dominating the international art market is an appealing avenue for elevating 
China’s soft power to attract the world’s wealthiest collectors. However, 
government-owned and operated art museums and auction houses do not 
necessarily lead to organic, thriving artistic developments. To create “a 
successful arts sector—it requires an interested audience, talent, and knowledge 
in areas ranging from curation to promotion” in a dynamic and artistically free 
environment.130 While China may have the requisite domestic, viable, and 
growing art collector climate, “there is a certain sense of artificiality that cannot 
be ignored” in the Chinese art sector itself.131 
 
C. ART AS AN ECONOMIC DRIVING FORCE 
 
The trade of cultural property impacts millions of people in private and 
public sectors. In 2017 and 2018, the global art and antiques market employed 
roughly 3 million people and there were 310,700 businesses operating within the 
sector.132 In the gallery and dealer sector, 2.7 million people were employed 
throughout 296,550 businesses.133 In 2018, the auction sector employed 281,325 
people globally throughout 14,150 businesses.134 In the first half of 2019 alone, 
global auction sales reached $5.55 billion dollars.135 Christie’s global revenue 
was estimated at $7 billion, and Sotheby’s global revenue was estimated at $1.03 
billion in 2018.136 In 2018, the global art trade spent $20.2 billion on external 
support services directly linked to their businesses, which added 375,030 jobs.137 
The global art world spent $4.8 billion on art fairs, and $3.2 billion on 
advertising and marketing.138 Although the $67 billion art industry is 
comparatively smaller than other luxury industries, such as the $500 billion 
global luxury car market, the economic impact of one art sale induces 
disproportionately more spending in ancillary services and businesses that 
generate revenues, employment, and fiscal government benefits.139  
One major factor shaping the economics of the art industry is the rapid 
growth of high net worth individuals globally.140 In 2018, there were an 
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estimated 42.2 million global millionaires, with roughly 4.5 million emerging 
from China.141 It’s no surprise that the majority of art sales took place in the 
U.S., which dominates the world’s top 1% wealth holders at 39% of that top 1%, 
followed by China at 9%, then the U.K. at 6%.142 Most art collectors fall above 
the $100,000 bracket, which is about 479 million people globally (about 10% of 
all adults) and is expected to reach 567 million over the next few years, mostly 
from the U.S. and China.143 The collective wealth of millionaires could total 
more than $180 trillion by 2023.144 There were a record-breaking 2,208 
billionaires in 2018, with a combined net worth of $9.1 trillion.145 The U.S. also 
led this sector with 35% of billionaire wealth, but China followed with a close 
17% share, with Japan trailing at 17%.146 The amount of billionaires is expected 
to surpass 3,000 by 2023, dominated by the U.S. and China.147 Emerging 
economies have accounted for 22% growth in ultra-high net worth individuals 
(UHNWIs) since 2000.148   
A thriving national cultural heritage also promotes tangible and intangible 
economic benefits such as education, tourism, and cultural capital. Cultural 
internationalists believe there should be complete liberalization of cultural 
exportation to ensure the best preservation of the objects important for all of 
humanity.149 Regulated cultural commodity exportation can allow source 
nations to maintain their cultural capital while profiting from those economic 
benefits of increased tourism, art transactions, and a more prominent national 
footprint.150 However, strict export regulation and embargoes can increase 
market nation demand by restricting source nation supply, thereby reducing 
legal methods of obtaining certain objects in high demand and incentivizing the 
emergence of illicit black markets.151 Although some market nations have 
established art and antiquities criminal enforcement units, law enforcement in 
source nations often lack the financial resources to track and capture perpetrators 
in the art and antiquities market where more serious crimes are prioritized.152 
Additionally, the sheer volume of cultural objects that must be inspected by 
customs officials reduces the authenticity scrutiny and legal assurance of all 
imported items.153 
The rapid rise of wealthy and influential private collectors, who are largely 
unregulated in their personal purchases of cultural property, has coincided with 
the illegal international art and antiquities black market to become a multi-
billion operation. It is also widely-known to involve complex global criminal 
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networks154 and even directly fund terrorist organizations.155 For example, 
Southern Italian mafia organizations such as the Cosa Nostra, Ndrangheta and 
Camorra groups use their territorial influence to control important Italian 
archeological sites to launder their other criminal activity profits through the 
illicit art trade.156 The art and antiquities black market poses a particular threat 
to Italian cultural heritage because Italy has comparatively more restrictive 
cultural heritage exportation laws than other European countries and has an 
overabundance of highly desirable antiquities.157 In 2017, Italy lifted some of its 
strict export restrictions for a more liberalized free trade market for post-war 
artists in an attempt to deter national illicit art trade.158  
The illegal art market is subject to the same market forces of the legal 
international trade except it doesn’t play by the same rules. Just as how the legal 
art world depends on countless players for a successful market, the illegal trade 
also relies on a network of traffickers, officials, and dealers to smuggle, forge, 
and sell licenses, certifications, and cultural artifacts.159 The art and antiquities 
illegal market is now as lucrative as the black market for counterfeit goods, 
weapons, and drugs.160 Illegal cultural objects and their accompanying 
documentation can be forged, stolen, and manipulated into exact replicas of the 
original artefacts that are then sold through legitimate dealers and auction houses 
to foreign markets.161  
 
 
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE TRADE WAR ART TARIFFS 
  
A. PRIVATE PARTIES: AUCTION HOUSES AND INDIVIDUAL 
COLLECTORS 
 
1. Auction Houses 
 
There are three methods for foreign firms to directly invest in China: the 
Equity Joint Venture (EJV) (discussed above in regards to the 1979 Joint 
Venture Law), the contractual or cooperative joint venture (CJV), or the wholly 
foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE).162 Christie’s is the only WFOE auction 
house to operate without a local partner under the EJV or CJV.163 A WFOE is 
the least popular method and rarely established in China because it is deemed 
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the most capitalist and government-restricted enterprise that prevents 
technology transfers, party equity, profits and involvement (control).164 
Additionally, most or all WFOE products must be exported using Chinese 
technology and equipment in operations and must be considered beneficial to 
the country’s economy.165 Christie’s independence as a WFOE is conditioned 
upon certain license deal restrictions, including a prohibition on trading Chinese 
cultural relics that predate 1911 or objects the government deems are vital to 
Chinese culture.166 Goods that fall into that restricted category are not only those 
that were included in the initial U.S. tariff, but are also considered the most 
valuable collectibles in the Chinese market.167  
Although the U.S. is positioned to maintain its dominant role as the 
epicenter of global wealth and the leading art market, the rise of China’s wealth 
will directly influence its art market development and global foothold. As part 
of its Belt and Road Initiative that designated “culture” as a strategic industry, 
China successfully encouraged new generations of art collectors to invest in their 
own private collections and create private galleries, built 3,500 public art 
museums by 2012 (for comparison, the U.S. typically creates 20-30 new 
museums per year), and enacted policies that led to the establishment of six of 
the top ten global auction houses that are both privately-owned, such as China 
Guardian, and state-owned, such as Poly International.168 A major concern 
surrounding the vast and precipitous growth and demand in China is the 
authenticity standards and the legitimacy of acquisition, particularly from 
conflict regions where stolen antiquities can fund terrorist organizations.169 
While countries like the U.S. and U.K. have closed their markets on Middle 
Eastern conflict antiquities due to the looting and trafficking crisis of war, the 
Chinese government is trying to fill that demand and its recently constructed 
empty museums with art.170 Poly International is not only the world’s third 
largest auction house after Sotheby’s and Christie’s but also government-owned 
and one of the world’s largest arms traders with a history of past transgressions 
for illegal arms shipments that caused the U.S. to sanction the company for 
violating the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act.171   
China maintains a tightly regulated and heavily monopolistic domestic 
market that restricts foreign firms’ access while actively promoting Chinese 
companies to expand overseas.172 The strict regulatory environment and 
uncertainty surrounding the trade war has caused several foreign firms to shutter 
their galleries and auction houses in China. These Chinese firms are operating 
with essentially no foreign competition domestically because only Christie’s has 
been authorized to conduct independent sales in mainland China or Hong Kong 
without a local Chinese partnership.173 Moreover, only Chinese-owned auction 
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houses are allowed to trade cultural heritage antiquities and collectibles that 
predate 1911, which are considered to be the most valuable pieces among 
Chinese clientele.174 While governments have traditionally been major patrons 
of art through direct funding or various tax incentives, too much regulation or 
taxes can stagnate growth and natural financial and cultural exchanges.175 The 
most successful art markets are those with the most freedom and flexibility to 
trade while protecting investors with high transactional standards and preventing 
criminal activity.  
 
2. Art Collectors 
 
One major counterargument is that this tariff only impacts the top 1% of the 
world’s elite who can afford to purchase these discretionary luxury items for 
their own private collections. If a collector can afford a multi-million-dollar 
painting, what’s an extra 15-25% added onto the purchase price? In fact, one 
Chinese dealer disagreed that the tariff would significantly affect the global art 
market because the Chinese art and antiques market is largely traded regionally 
or domestically.176 Since other countries like Singapore, Switzerland, and France 
often tax art imports around 5.5% to 8%, a tariff of 10% would not deter most 
collectors or dealers.177 But a 10% tariff is not the proposed 15% or even 25% 
tariff. Notably, many of these pieces date back hundreds, if not thousands, of 
years ago and are already largely restricted from being imported into the U.S. 
under various bilateral treaties protecting cultural heritage. Admittedly, the U.S. 
is a relatively small importer of Chinese art and antiquities ($408 million sales 
in North America was a mere 6% out of the global total of $7.1 billion), but that 
means the smaller market in the U.S. will feel an even greater disproportionate 
negative impact by the tariffs. Additionally, one of the main problems this tariff 
exacerbates is the “slow turnover of inventory in the art trade and that a tariff 
would mean greater capital outlays by dealers.”178  
Most importantly, these counterarguments overlook the integral role these 
transactions play within international relations. “Collecting art from a foreign 
country is an attribute of power” and “virtually every act in the movement of art 
between cultures has political implications.”179  Generally, “citizens of powerful 
countries...have greater opportunity to travel, have more money with which to 
buy, more space in which to display.”180 The influential rise of Chinese citizens’ 
consumer power was reflected in Shanghai’s coveted crowning as “the place to 
be for contemporary art” in 2017.181 Kelly Ying, a 30-something year old art 
collector and co-founder of Shanghai art fair ART021 summed up the radical 
revolution of Chinese collectors: “Fifteen years ago, the rich flocked to luxury 
goods, especially designer brands, to announce themselves. Nowadays, the elite 
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have art. If you are someone who’s anyone, you are an art collector.”182 The 
growing Chinese middle class has established and cultivated an environment for 
art collection as an investment. “A sense of national pride in promoting Eastern 
aesthetics . . . is aligned with the growing cultural understanding of the Chinese 
and Asian buyers.”183   
China’s art market is the second largest in the world and its growing class 
of consumers is driving global art trends, quickly closing the price gap between 
Western and Chinese art, and scooping up Western and Asian pieces equally for 
their museums and private collections.184 Major Chinese collectors include 
billionaires such as art couple Liu Yiqian and Wang Wei, Lin Han, Wanwan Lei, 
Adrian Cheng, Kelly Ying, David Chau, Wang Jianlin, Alan Lau, Joseph Lau, 
and several other tastemakers who are molding the Chinese art ecosystem. These 
individuals are breaking world records for auction price purchases, establishing 
educational art institutes, backing Chinese artists, and establishing art galleries 
and art fairs to showcase Asian art, and many of them are under the age of 40.185 
Maturing generations of art collectors who were born after the 1970s economic 
reform under Deng Xiaoping were raised with a more international perspective, 
were granted access to higher education, and are now transforming what it 
means to be a modern art collector. “Their wealth, sophisticated educational 
background and overseas exposure have reinvented the culture of collecting in 
China.”186 When art collecting is viewed as a form of international relations, the 
political significance of Chinese ownership of Western masterpieces coupled 
with their rapid collection and repatriation of Chinese contemporary and 
antiquated art cannot be ignored.187  
However, it should not necessarily be perceived as a negative that Chinese 
collectors are the influential tastemakers reorienting the focus of the 
international art market. For most of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, the American appreciation of Chinese art and culture was limited to 
its main exports of tea, silk, and porcelain chinaware, and many Chinese artists 
produced art that was tailored to the Western gaze because it was deemed more 
“exotic” and therefore more valuable for trade.188 Additionally, when 
international demand for Asian antiquities boomed in the early 1900s, China lost 
much of its cultural heritage to looters amidst domestic political strife when there 
were no cultural property export laws in place to protect its national treasures 
from being taken.189  
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Despite the East Asian art exhibitions in most American museums during 
the early 20th century, Chinese art did not fit the desired visual realism of the 
period and therefore often failed to meet Western standards.190 Additionally, the 
perception of China as a politically repressive and regressive nation that rejected 
Western ideals reduced the value of Asian art in the purses of ethnocentric 
American consumers.191 
 
Generalized contempt for Asians affected perceptions of Asian 
art. It was different, it was Asian, it was therefore inferior . . . 
to accept the aesthetic values, artistic conventions, and symbols 
of another culture, to accept the work of its artists as something 
more than exotica or curiosities, is to grant dignity to that other 
culture . . . . To accept East Asian art as real art was a step 
toward accepting East Asians as real people.192 
 
It wasn’t until WWII that American collectors truly began distinguishing and 
collecting Chinese art at a time when systemic anti-Japanese sentiment was at 
its peak.193 Unfortunately, the influx of Chinese art to the West during and post-
WWII was largely due to the chaos of armed conflict that resulted in the looting 
of many East Asian collections.194 But this flow of Eastern and Western art was 
abruptly ceased due to the emerging concerns of Communism following the 
Chinese civil war and underlying the U.S.-China political tensions of the Korean 
War.195 During the Korean War, the U.S. military strategy included economic 
warfare tactics that prohibited the import of any Chinese good, including 
Chinese art.196 Despite the influential push by major art institutions and 
American collectors like John D. Rockefeller III and Avery Brundage, there 
were no art imports from China until the 1970s when political tensions finally 
thawed.197  Today, that modern cultural transference flows both ways: “as 
American power grew in East Asia, more and more art could be found in the 
United States. As that power ebb[s], some of the art flow[s] back with it” and 
“the volume of the flow reflects [that shift in] power.”198  
 
 
B. PUBLIC PARTIES: ART FAIRS AND MUSEUMS 
 
1. Art Fairs 
 
One of the art sectors most heavily impacted by the trade war are the smaller 
art galleries and art fairs that specialize in Chinese art and cater to the middle-
market. Art fairs offer a bridge between the more private world of luxury art 
auctions and the smaller, local galleries because the general public is invited to 
view and purchase art from across the world. The owner of one contemporary 
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Chinese art gallery, Chambers Fine Art, said, “[i]f there is a 25 percent tariff on 
that, it would make our lives extremely difficult. Nearly all of the artists 
Chambers shows are Chinese, and the majority of them live and work inside 
China.”199 In the spirit of cities competing to host the Olympics, art fairs are 
continuing to explode on the world stage to the point of “Fairtigue.”200 With 
almost 300 art fairs globally in 2019, host cities are clamoring to become the 
next cultural capital for the art world in an ever-more saturated market.201 Host 
cities bring together artists, collectors, curators, dealers, and galleries to connect 
and transact with the goal of boosting the city’s image as a destination for the 
major art market.202 Those that successfully attract crowds also benefit from the 
art fairs’ ancillary tourism and hospitality revenues. Not only is the art fair 
market over-saturated, but smaller gallerists are often disadvantaged because the 
fairs “disproportionately benefit the top players over the midsize and little guys, 
who often pay similar amounts to participate but offer less expensive work.”203  
Although some collectors are deterred by the overarching “soft power” 
political agendas of art fairs that are increasingly homogenizing the artistic 
forums amidst the modern “experiential economy,”  these exhibitions will 
continue to play a vital role both economically and politically.204 Throughout 
history, international art fairs and exhibitions have always represented 
“opportunities to enhance other means of obtaining political ends,” including 
generating general goodwill and positive publicity; however, over time, more 
diplomats and statesmen are becoming private collectors, and government 
agencies are recruiting museum curators, art historians, area specialists, and art 
dealers more frequently for intelligence work or for their assistance in more 




Unlike the periodic art fairs and exhibitions that reflect the art market’s trade 
and commercialization, art museums embody the enduring academic, historical, 
cultural, and political narrative of a particular society.  American museums 
contribute $50 billion to the domestic economy annually, employ more than 
726,000 people, and receive more visitors annually than all major sporting 
events and theme parks combined.206 These permanent institutions are perceived 
to be more trustworthy and reliable sources of history than schools, the 
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government, and the media.207 Cultural internationalists favor museums because 
they preserve and provide access to humanity’s collective cultural property, 
foster important cross-cultural understanding, and educate the general public.208  
However, most American museums are non-profits that depend heavily 
upon government funding and private donations to operate, not unlike many of 
the museums in China.209 Despite academic objectivity, art museums are 
inescapably “complex reflections of the cultures that produced them, including 
their politics, social structures, and systems of thought.”210 Western museums 
were historically “tool[s] of colonialism” that showcased the “exotic riches and 
curiosities” of other cultures according to its rewritten narrative of society’s 
development and progress that often culminated in a nation-centric apex.211  
Art museums encompass the “political concepts of power, legitimacy and 
ideology.”212 Take, for example, the largest and most visited museum in the 
world: The Louvre in Paris, France. It has about 9.3 million visitors annually.213 
It was established as a royal salon curated by, and for, the king of France.214 
During the French Revolution, taking control of and destroying the art in royal 
palaces, churches, and other government sites symbolized the democratization 
of the nation as the people transformed private royal galleries into highly visible, 
accessible public museums.215  “A political ideology is not merely a series of 
assertions; it is a multi-media aesthetic surround” and there is no better place to 





There is a delicate balance between the nationalist cultural property theory 
dedicated to protecting a nation’s cultural heritage and the internationalist 
cultural property theory that emphasizes preserving these objects for the 
betterment of humanity.217 The capacious internationalist definitions of state and 
international statutes discussed above serve to protect the diversity of culturally 
significant objects that comprise a nation, its history, and its people. However, 
these conventions fail to address the necessary protection of cultural property 
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and illegal trafficking of art permeate. Shouldn’t the protection of art be 
extended under modern economic warfare conditions?  
Traditional warfare and economic warfare share the common goal of 
defeating one’s opponent, and the terminology of a trade war reflects the military 
strategy of the battlefield. Sun Tzu’s infamous book, The Art of War, argued that 
“using economic instead of martial means is a superior method of defeating 
one’s enemies.”218 Current and future warfare will be “fought on the field of 
trade, capital markets, and finance”219 where society and its citizens are the 
target. As British military historian Nicholas Lambert explained, “economic 
warfare target[s] the enemy’s society by deranging its national economy with 
the object of rapidly undermining the legitimacy of and domestic support for the 
enemy state . . . .”220 In economic warfare, consumers are the target. 
Cultural property is weaponized, especially in economic or ideological 
warfare, and is a direct reflection of a nation’s foreign policy. Countries vying 
for power use their art industries as a form of soft power to export their political 
ideologies and identities. This paper prompts deeper contemplation of what 
constitutes cultural property and the inherent transactional value of important 
tangible objects. It touches on how imposing tariffs on art is a symbolic rejection 
of a nation’s culture, history, and socio-political identity, which reveals 
historical xenophobic discrimination and places a steep toll on essential cross-
cultural understanding. Additionally, the more restrictive trade regulation, the 
more likely illicit art trade will emerge and pose a major risk to the preservation 
of original art.  
Most antiquities and art that fall within the scope of these tariffs are 
imported from other European nations, not China. Chinese art and antiquities 
dating from centuries ago do not threaten the modern manufacturing, IP theft, or 
military strategy that President Trump attempted to protect in his imposed trade 
war tariffs. The current trade war is reminiscent of the anti-communist rhetoric 
of the Cold War while simultaneously missing its main target: China’s economy. 
These tariffs only benefit the Chinese collectors who are not subject to the 
punitive tax and can further monopolize and shift the art world’s focus from 
New York and London to Hong Kong and Shanghai as the new epicenters of art 
and culture. These tariffs damage the global art trade, American collectors, 
museums, gallerists, and the public. By erecting such a high barrier as to 
effectively prohibit the importation of certain significant and irreplaceable 
Chinese artwork, U.S. foreign policy is choosing to reject Chinese ideologies at 
the expense of its own citizens and  economy. But maybe that is the exact point 
of President Trump’s nationalist economic foreign trade policy because, as 
American military strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan said, “To bring the pressure 
of war to bear upon the whole population, and not merely upon the armies in the 
field, is the very spirit of modern warfare.”221 
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